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595 
IT’S NOT WHAT IS ON PAPER, BUT WHAT IS IN 
PRACTICE: CHINA’S NEW LABOR CONTRACT 
LAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM 
INTRODUCTION 
After decades of implementing a lifetime employment system, China 
has decided to shift gear and rely on private contracts to regulate domestic 
labor relations.1 The new Labor Contract Law, which officially took effect 
on January 1, 2008, memorializes this change.2 Proponents of the new law 
lauded it as “the most concerted effort to protect workers’ rights.”3 Yet 
many provisions in the law touched the nerves of quite a few domestic and 
foreign businesses in China4 and are criticized as overly generous to labor 
rights.5  
 
 
 1. Labor relations are critical to the stability of Chinese society. See infra note 18 and 
accompanying text.  
 2. Laodong hetong fa [Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 31, 2008), 
art. 98 (P.R.C.). The Labor Contract Law is one of the trilogy of labor laws adopted by China in 2007. 
The other two are Laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai fa [Law on Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 
1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 31, 2008) (P.R.C.), and Jiuye cujin fa [Employment 
Promotion Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective 
Jan. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 31, 2008) (P.R.C.). The Law on Labor Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration sets forth the administrative procedures preceding judicial resolution of 
labor disputes. The Employment Promotion Law addresses employment discrimination and high 
unemployment rates. 
 3. Labor Laws Bolstered in China, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 2, 2008, at 9 (quoting Auret van 
Heerden, head of Fair Labor Association in Geneva, which monitors work conditions in sixty 
countries). 
 4. European and U.S. companies in China sent vociferous critiques of drafts of the law to the 
national legislature and even threatened to divest from China. See Aaron Halegua, The Debate over 
Raising Chinese Labor Standards Goes International, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Online) (2007), 
http://www.hlpronline.com/2007/04/halegua_01.html; GLOBAL LABOR STRATEGIES, BEHIND THE 
GREAT WALL OF CHINA: U.S. CORPORATIONS OPPOSING NEW RIGHTS FOR CHINESE WORKERS: 
OPPOSITION MAY HARM WORKERS IN THE US AND OTHER COUNTRIES 3 (2007), http://laborstrategies. 
blogs.com/global_labor_strategies/files/behind_the_great_wall_of_china.pdf [hereinafter BEHIND THE 
GREAT WALL OF CHINA]; GLOBAL LABOR STRATEGIES, UNDUE INFLUENCE: CORPORATIONS GAIN 
GROUND IN BATTLE OVER CHINA’S NEW LABOR LAW—BUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR ADVOCATES 
ARE PUSHING BACK 4 (2007), http://laborstrategies.blogs.com/global_labor_strategies/files/undue_ 
influence_global_labor_strategies.pdf [hereinafter UNDUE INFLUENCE]. Labor activists have criticized 
such responses by foreign corporations as a conspiracy to maintain low labor costs in China and 
perpetuate the “race to the bottom.” See BEHIND THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA, supra, at 7–9; UNDUE 
INFLUENCE, supra, at 10, 29–30. For an explanation of the “race to the bottom,” see Stephen F. 
Diamond, The “Race to the Bottom” Returns: China’s Challenge to the International Labor 
Movement, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 39, 42–44 (2003). 
 5. The criticisms emphasize that under this new pro-labor law China would regress to the era 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
596 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:595 
 
 
 
 
Around the same time the new law passed the national legislature, a 
slough of media reports uncovered a labor scandal that victimized over 
one thousand rural workers in China. A total of 1,340 people, including 
minors and the mentally incompetent, had been kidnapped to work in 
small brick kilns in central China as forced labor.6 Owners of the brick 
kilns used fierce dogs and thugs to prevent the slave labor from escaping. 
The laborers worked without receiving any pay and some were beaten to 
death for working too slowly.7  
The stark contrast—on one hand, a legal framework that almost 
excessively empowers workers, and on the other hand, atrocious labor 
exploitation that brings to mind China’s reputation as the world’s largest 
sweatshop—begs the question: what is wrong with China’s labor system?  
This Note argues that even with a pro-labor legal framework on paper, 
the real problem for the Chinese labor system is the disconnect between 
the legal standards spelled out on paper and the rules actually enforced on 
the ground. Even before the promulgation of the Labor Contract Law, 
China had already established a sufficient legal framework on paper, the 
1994 Labor Law for protecting workers’ rights. The missing link is the 
effective enforcement of the law. Part I of this Note describes China’s 
current labor conditions and summarizes some major features of the new 
Labor Contract Law that tilt the scale further toward protecting labor 
rights. Part II examines the existing labor law enforcement regime from 
the points of view of four parties: employers, individual workers, 
government administration authorities, and trade unions. These four 
parties have either incentives or obligations to enforce the law. The action 
and/or inaction by these four parties reveal practical problems in grassroot 
law enforcement in China, some of which this author predicts are unlikely 
to be resolved in the near future. Still, the Chinese government seems 
interested in channeling the discontent and anger brewing in the workforce 
through legal mechanisms and addressing them in a peaceful way. Part III 
explores the possibility for workers to bring class action lawsuits in China 
and discusses whether collective actions could overcome some of the 
identified enforcement problems. This Note concludes that, even though 
class action lawsuits in China still face institutional difficulties, they may 
 
 
when workers were rarely fired and lifetime employment was almost guaranteed. See infra note 37. 
 6. 1,340 Rescued from Forced Labor, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 13, 2007, http://www.chinadaily. 
com.cn/china/2007-08/13/content_6024799.htm.  
 7. China Detains 168 After Brick Kiln Slavery Scandal, REUTERS, June 18, 2007, http://www. 
alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/PEK225293.htm. 
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lead to better enforcement of labor law than under the current system and 
are a politically viable option.  
I. BACKGROUND AND HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEW LAW 
Labor relations have been a “sensitive and contentious” subject in 
China.8 The Chinese government first introduced the concept of labor 
contracts in the 1980s to phase out the “iron rice bowl” system—a 
figurative term for lifetime employment—that resulted in low productivity 
in state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”).9 The 1994 Labor Law codified the 
policies and regulations that had been issued previously for this purpose.10 
It explicitly requires that a labor contract be formed before an employment 
relationship can be established.11  
In the meantime, China’s economic reform gave rise to booming 
development of the private sector, which consists mostly of foreign-
invested enterprises (“FIEs”) and domestic private enterprises.12 The 
private sector hired rural migrant workers at a lower cost,13 and according 
 
 
 8. Hilary K. Josephs, Labor Law in a “Socialist Market Economy”: The Case of China, 33 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 559, 560 (stating that China passed its first comprehensive labor law in 
1994 after an extremely protracted drafting process, the beginning of which dated back to the 1950s). 
 9. HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA: CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY 7–21 (1990). The 
“Iron rice bowl” is a figurative term for lifetime employment and administrative allocation of labor. 
See id. The initial attempt to phase out lifetime employment did not work. Labor turnover in SOEs 
remained very low as workers all knew that employment outside the state sector would not provide the 
same job security and fringe benefits. Josephs, supra note 8, at 564. As a result, the contract system 
was soon used to facilitate mass layoffs in the state sector. Mary E. Gallagher, “Time Is Money, 
Efficiency Is Life”: The Transformation of Labor Relations in China, STUDIES IN COMP. INT’L DEV., 
June 2004, at 11, 22–23. 
 10. Josephs, supra note 8, at 565. Systematic codification and distillation of existing laws and 
regulations on a subject is typical of civil law jurisdictions. Id. 
 11. Laodong fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 
1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 31, 2008), art. 16 (P.R.C.). 
 12. See Ming Lu, Jianyong Fan, Shejian Liu & Yan Yan, Employment Restructuring During 
China’s Economic Transition, 125 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 25 (2002) (providing statistics to show that 
private enterprises and the service sector have become the major job creators, while state and 
collective ownership enterprises have been swept to the margin). 
 13. Josephs, supra note 8, at 564–65. Companies were able to hire rural migrant workers at a 
lower cost thanks to China’s hukou, or household registration, system. Used to “control the growth of 
the urban population and maintain urban living standards,” the system requires each individual to 
register in either a rural or urban area but not both. Josephs, supra note 9, at 14. It requires people to 
work and live where their household registration is (usually their birthplace). Zhiqiang Liu, Institution 
and Inequality: The Hukou System in China, 33 J. COMP. ECON. 133, 134 (2005); JOSEPHS, supra note 
9, at 14. Thus, rural workers who migrate to and work in cities do not have a legal identity. They lose 
their entitlements to all kinds of social benefits, including government-subsidized housing, pensions, 
and health insurance because these benefits are associated with one’s residence for the convenience of 
central planning. Liu, supra, at 136.  
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to official statistics, approximately 120 million rural workers migrated to 
and are currently working in cities.14  
The move toward privatization has caused labor practices in China to 
shift “overwhelmingly toward favoring firm autonomy, flexibility, and 
managerial control of work organization.”15 As FIEs and domestic private 
enterprises took advantage of low labor costs, manufacturing sweatshops 
staffed by rural migrants started to appear.16 Migrant workers from rural 
areas “bear the brunt of labor abuses.”17  
The new Labor Contract Law, adopted more than a decade after the 
1994 Labor Law, reiterates the government’s determination to formulate 
and regulate labor relations on the basis of a contract system. It is worth 
noting that the main reason for adopting the 2007 Labor Contract Law is 
different from the motivation behind the 1994 Labor Law. While the 1994 
law was aimed at removing inefficiency in state-owned enterprises, the 
2007 law has more of a political undertone. It seeks to appease discontent 
and anger among migrant workers who experienced substandard labor 
conditions in cities and took out their fury and frustrations in the form of 
social unrest and violent crimes.18  
The 2007 Labor Contract Law makes the following significant 
amendments and additions to the 1994 Labor Law: 
A. Requirement of a Written Labor Contract 
The law requires the formation of a written labor contract at the 
commencement of a labor relationship19 or within one month thereafter.20 
 
 
 14. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, China to Enroll 
More Migrant Workers into Unions (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t303000. 
htm. 
 15. Gallagher, supra note 9, at 13.  
 16. See STEPHEN FROST, WORKERS’ RIGHTS FOR THE NEW CENTURY 16–36 (2002); see 
generally ANITA CHAN, CHINA’S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: THE EXPLOITATION OF LABOR IN A 
GLOBALIZING ECONOMY (2001).  
 17. Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in 
the People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1054 n.15 (2007) (providing a 
bibliography on the mistreatment of migrant workers). 
 18. See Joseph Kahn & David Barboza, As Unrest Rises, China Broadens Workers’ Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A1 (stating that the passage of the Labor Contract Law came on the heels of 
media reports about the widespread use of slave labor in thousands of brick kilns and small coal 
mines). The labor scandal has caused complaints that the Chinese government has over-zealously 
embraced capitalism at the cost of labor rights. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Teaching ADR in the 
Labor Field in China, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 105, 108 (2003) (“The government seems to have 
adopted the philosophy: Grow the market today and let a future generation deal with social problems 
and the need for greater economic equality.”).  
 19. The Labor Contract Law provides that a labor relationship is established on the day the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss3/7
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In the event that an employer fails to sign a written contract within one 
year of the commencement of the labor relationship, the employer shall be 
deemed to have entered into a non-fixed-duration contract with the 
employee and must pay double the amount of the agreed upon wage.21  
An employer may choose from three types of contracts: fixed-duration 
contracts, non-fixed-duration contracts, and contracts that expire upon 
completion of a certain task.22 However, the employer must enter into a 
non-fixed-duration contract after an employee has continuously worked 
for the employer for ten years, or if he has previously renewed a fixed-
duration contract with the same employer twice, unless the employee opts 
out.23 Again, if the employer fails to enter into the required non-fixed-
duration contract, it must pay double the agreed upon wage.24  
B. Termination of the Contract 
The new law gives employees the right to terminate a labor contract 
with just cause.25 However, it prohibits the employer from terminating 
contracts with those who have been working continuously for the 
employer for fifteen years and have less than five years before reaching 
the legal retirement age.26 When there is a need for downsizing, the law 
requires the employer to consider last those who have longer fixed-
duration contracts or non-fixed-duration contracts, or who are the only one 
employed in their family and have an elderly person or a minor to 
support.27  
What is most troubling to employers is that the law renders the 
termination of a contract more expensive to the employer, regardless of 
 
 
worker starts providing labor to the employer. Labor Contract Law, supra note 2, art. 7. 
 20. Compare Labor Contract Law, supra note 2, art. 10 with Labor Law, supra note 11, art. 16 
(providing that a labor contract should be established without specifying a written requirement). 
 21. Labor Contract Law, supra note 2, arts. 14, 82. 
 22. Id. art. 12. This is the same as the Labor Law, supra note 11.  
 23. Labor Contract Law, supra note 2, art. 14. Under the 1994 Labor Law, the employer does not 
have the obligation to enter into a non-fixed-duration contract unless the employee opts in. Labor Law, 
supra note 11, art. 20.  
 24. Labor Contract Law, supra note 2, art. 82. 
 25. Id. art. 38. In the event of one of the following conditions, an employee may terminate the 
contract by giving notice to the employer: the employer failed to provide work safety measures, failed 
to pay timely work remunerations, failed to pay social security on behalf of the employee, infringed 
the employee’s labor rights and interests in violation of laws and regulations, or caused the employee 
to enter into the contract under fraud or coercion. An employer has always had the right to terminate 
for just cause under both the 1994 and 2007 laws. See id. arts. 39–41; Labor Law, supra note 11, arts. 
25–27. 
 26. Labor Contract Law, supra note 2, art. 42. 
 27. Id. art. 41. 
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whether it was terminated by the employer or employee, or whether it was 
terminated for just cause.28  
C. Union Power 
The law adds that any management decision regarding the 
establishment or modification of remuneration, work time, holidays and 
vacation, workers’ safety conditions, insurance and benefits, training, 
discipline, or any other conditions of employment, must first be subject to 
equal negotiations with the union or workers’ representatives.29  
D. Notice and Record  
The law requires that any major changes concerning workers’ interests 
must be publicly posted on the premises of the workplace or provided in 
some other ways.30 It also requires employers to establish and preserve a 
roster of all employees for inspection purposes.31  
E. Other Provisions 
The law shortens the length of the probation period.32 It provides that 
employers may not force employees to work overtime and that employees 
must be compensated if they do work overtime.33 It provides rules for 
regulating labor dispatch and part-time employees.34 It also requires that a 
recruiting employer must truthfully inform applicants of all relevant 
information and may not hold applicants’ IDs or other documents 
hostage.35 
 
 
 28. See id. arts. 46–47. In the event a labor contract is terminated upon the parties’ agreement—
by either the employer or the employee—for just cause or due to special circumstances such as the 
need to reorganize, downsize, declare bankruptcy, or other special business needs, an employer must 
make severance payments to the affected employee in the amount of one month’s wage for each year 
worked by the employee for the employer. In the event that the employer terminates a contract in 
violation of the law, the employee has the right to request continued performance of the contract, 
otherwise the employer must pay damages in an amount that is double the severance payment.  
 29. Id. art. 4. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. art. 7. 
 32. Id. art. 19 (stating that the probation period shall be no more than one month for contracts of 
three months to one year, no more than two months for contracts of one to three years, and no more 
than six months for contracts of above three years or of non-fixed duration; the number of probation 
periods for each employee is limited to one). 
 33. Id. art. 31. 
 34. Id. arts. 57–72.  
 35. Id. arts. 8–9. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss3/7
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The 1994 Labor Law already established a sufficient legal framework 
for protecting labor rights, which is comparable to those in Western 
developed countries.36 The 2007 Labor Contract Law favors labor rights 
even more. The law has many detractors who claim it will take China back 
to the “iron rice bowl” era.37 Whether the new law will really bring back 
the lifetime employment system and cause productivity to drop is yet to be 
seen. The one thing certain is that China’s notoriety for labor abuse should 
not be attributed to the way the law is written, but rather to how the law is 
enforced in practice.38  
II. THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT REGIME 
The lack of effective and meaningful law enforcement is a chronic 
problem in China. In the realm of labor and employment law, employers 
have refused to take laws and regulations seriously and instead adopted a 
flexible approach to managing labor relations.39 Individual workers lack 
law-enforcement initiatives due to ignorance, culture, and scarcity of 
resources.40 State and local labor administrations have the legal authority 
to enforce labor laws but lack incentives to do so.41 Trade unions, whose 
interests have been aligned with the Communist Party, do not have the 
legal power to seek law enforcement on behalf of workers.42  
 
 
 36. Halegua, supra note 4; Kahn & Barboza, supra note 18.  
 37. See China’s Top Legislature Defends New Labor Contract Law, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, 
Dec. 21, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/22/content_7290979.htm; Union of the 
State: China’s New Labour Law, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2007, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/ 
displaystory.cfm?story_id=10268128.  
 38. See Halegua, supra note 4; Cooney, supra note 17, at 1096 (observing that the challenge for 
dealing with labor abuses in China is securing compliance); New Labor Contract Law Changes 
China’s Employment Landscape, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/ 
2008-01/01/content_6362895.htm (suggesting that a varied intensity of law enforcement in regions 
could result in a difference in labor costs for businesses).  
 39. See Gallagher, supra note 9, at 24–25. Both SOEs and FIEs chose to make labor contracts 
informal and short-term (between one and two years), which means dismissals were arbitrary 
depending on the company’s economic health; some FIEs also set up long apprenticeships or 
probationary periods. See also Vai Io Lo, Labor and Employment in the People’s Republic of China: 
From a Nonmarket-Driven to a Market-Driven Economy, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 337, 377 
n.267 (1995–1996) (stating that seventy to ninety percent of FIEs in major coastal economic cities did 
not sign employment contracts as of the time of the 1994 Labor Law). However, Mary Gallagher has 
pointed out that for skilled workers, or those for whom the employer offered training and educational 
benefits, both SOEs and FIEs tend to provide open-ended contracts. Gallagher, supra note 9, at 25.  
 40. See infra notes 54–82. 
 41. See infra notes 83–91. 
 42. See infra notes 92–112. 
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A. Voluntary Compliance by Employers 
Domestic private enterprises and FIEs do not have a good track record 
in complying with labor and employment laws, including establishing 
contracts with employees and maintaining labor standards.  
According to unofficial statistics, only twenty percent of domestic 
private companies signed contracts with their employees before the 2007 
Labor Contract Law was adopted.43 Only twenty percent of Chinese 
suppliers to multinational companies comply with wage rules, while just 
five percent obey hour limitations.44 Domestic enterprises often rely on 
their relationships with the government to evade legal requirements.45 
Other common methods used to avoid compliance with laws include 
keeping two sets of books and instructing illegal laborers to hide from 
inspectors.46  
Employment practices at FIEs are more varied. Investors from the 
United States and Europe have brought with them international labor 
practices and a higher labor standard than required by Chinese laws.47 
Japanese companies often adopt measures like long apprenticeship and 
probationary periods to reduce labor costs.48 Investors from Taiwan tend to 
hire on an “at will” basis with reduced wages and no contract.49  
The 2007 Labor Contract Law imposes some severe consequences on 
employers that refuse to comply.50 We have yet to see the impact of these 
measures on employment practices, but measures adopted by employers 
before the official promulgation of the new law seem to indicate that 
compliance is unlikely to happen soon. 
Anticipating higher labor costs after the adoption of the new law,51 
many employers made a last-minute end run by terminating employees 
 
 
 43. UNDUE INFLUENCE, supra note 4, at 8 (citing “Chinese government figures” without 
providing a source for the figures). 
 44. Halegua, supra note 4. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See Gallagher, supra note 9, at 31 (noting that European and American firms tend to adhere 
to labor regulations); Halegua, supra note 4. However, there are media reports that U.S. fast-food 
chains such as KFC, Pizza Hut, and McDonald’s pay only ¥4, or $0.52, per hour to entry-level 
employees by taking advantage of their part-time or student status. See China Probes Whether 
Workers Are Underpaid, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/ 
29/content_839714.htm.  
 48. See Gallagher, supra note 9, at 24. 
 49. Id. at 24; Lo, supra note 39, at 377 n.267. 
 50. See supra note 21, arts. 24, 28. 
 51. It is estimated that the Labor Contract Law alone would raise employers’ costs by eight 
percent. See Geoff Dyer & Tom Mitchell, Labor Law Set to Raise Costs in China, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2008, at 2. 
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with long service records and hiring new employees as replacements,52 
revising existing contracts of employment,53 and terminating employees 
before rehiring them on new contracts.54 These actions aim solely to 
postpone the impact of the new law on the bottom line.  
The employers that acted in anticipation of the new law are those that 
realized they would have to comply with the law sooner or later. There are 
still tens of thousands of domestic private businesses that know nothing 
about the law and will continue to keep two books or play “hide and seek” 
with inspectors. Merely raising the legal standard on paper would not 
compel those employers to change their employment practices.  
B. Enforcement by Individual Workers 
Rural migrant workers are generally not savvy to their legal rights and 
therefore disinclined to seek resolution of labor disputes through legal 
means. China has traditionally not maintained social order by the rule of 
law,55 as a two thousand-year-old Confucian proverb instructs, “it is better 
to be vexed to death than to bring a lawsuit.”56 Even these days the 
“formal legal system is almost entirely absent from the lives of most of 
China's citizens.”57 Instead, a majority of disputes in China end up being 
 
 
 52. See Don Lee, New Workers’ Rights Being Undermined in China, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2007, 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-chinalabor27dec27,1,6295009.story?coll=la-headlines-business 
(quoting a local media report that Wal-Mart dismissed 110 purchasing department workers in China as 
a scheme to preempt limits in the new labor contract law). 
 53. See Carrefour’s Re-signing of Labor Contract Causes Dispute, CHINACSR.COM, Dec. 28, 
2007, http://www.chinacsr.com/2007/12/28/1985-carrefours-re-signing-of-labor-contract-causes-
dispute/. 
 54. See Labor Laws Bolstered in China, supra note 3 (stating that China’s largest private telecom 
equipment manufacturer, Huawei, made termination offers to about seven thousand employees by the 
end of 2007).  
 55. The concept of “rule of law” was first incorporated into the Constitution in 1999. See Xianfa 
xiuzheng an [Amendment to the Constitution] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 
1999, effective Mar. 15, 1999) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 31, 2008), ch. III, § 7, art. 5 (P.R.C.) 
(“The People’s Republic of China governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist 
country under rule of law.”). See CONG.-EXEC. COMM. ON CHINA, FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND 
TRAVEL, ANNUAL REPORT 72 (2004) [hereinafter CECC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt04/CECCannRpt2004.pdf (noting that obtaining 
justice in China was not simply a question of law, but also a measure of one’s connections and 
persistence).  
 56. Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 
1201 (1966). 
 57. CECC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 72. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Christopher 
Day & Joel Hugenberger, Migrant Access to Civil Justice in Beijing, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 
167, 194 (2007) (observing that migrants’ greatest difficulty in obtaining relief from courts is their 
limited understanding of their rights). See, e.g., id. at n.128 (describing a teenage migrant who 
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resolved through quasi-formal channels, a typical example of which is the 
system of petitioning to offices through “letters and visits.”58 Such is the 
case for migrant laborers seeking resolution of disputes with their 
employers.59 However, the level of local officials’ response to those letters 
and visits is low.60 Additionally, migrant laborers tend to work illegally in 
cities due to the hukou, or residence registration, system.61 They are 
willing to work without identification or paper documentation.62 
Consequently, they are willing to put up with abuse and mistreatment by 
employers rather than file a complaint or bring a lawsuit, which would put 
them in trouble with the law.63  
Even if a migrant worker is aware of the legal means of protecting his 
rights, the existing legal framework stacks many odds against him.  
Individual workers claiming infringement of labor rights must undergo 
arbitration before they can sue in court.64 However, there are some 
inherent problems with the labor arbitration system. First and foremost, 
arbitral awards are hard to enforce.65 Statistics show that winning rates 
 
 
attended a migrant community organization’s training session and claimed that before attending the 
training she was not aware of the concept of sexual harassment). 
 58. CECC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 72. “Letters and visits” to an office, also 
called xinfang, is a traditional practice of petitioning to higher levels of officials for assistance. Id. The 
number of petitions (both letters and visits) to Party and government xinfang bureaus at the county 
level and higher is about 11.5 million per year, compared to the six million legal cases handled 
annually by the judiciary. Id. at 73. The 2003 Supreme People’s Court Work Report states that the 
entire Chinese judiciary handled forty-two million petitions during the preceding five years, as 
compared to approximately thirty million formal legal cases. Id.  
 59. See Cooney, supra note 17, at 1071 (“[P]oorer workers use oral or written complaints 
submitted to the labor department as their principle [sic] means of trying to engage State institutions to 
deal with labor abuses.”). See also Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal 
Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (2006) (examining the process of seeking legal redress through 
letters and visits to government officials). 
 60. See Woo, Day & Hugenberger, supra note 57, at 178 (stating that the level of response 
depends on the “subjective receptiveness of an official who may have little to gain from resolving the 
dispute”). It is estimated that the rate of response is 0.2%. Id. at 179.  
 61. Id. at n.61. 
 62. Id. at 185.  
 63. Id. at 178. 
 64. Previously, an individual must have exhausted both mandatory mediation within the 
workplace and mandatory arbitration outside the workplace before he could file a lawsuit. Qiye 
laodong zhengyi chuli tiaoli [Settlement of Labor Disputes in Enterprises] (issued by the St. Council 
on July 6, 1993, effective July 6, 1993), art. 6, translated in LAW INFO CHINA (last visited Jan. 19, 
2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Disputes Resolution Regulation]. Under the new Mediation and Arbitration 
Law, aggrieved workers are only required to undergo arbitration. Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 
1, 2008), art. 5, translated in LAW INFO CHINA (last visited Jan. 25, 2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
Mediation and Arbitration Law].  
 65. Jill E. Monnin, Extending the Reach of the Chinese Labor Law: How Does the Supreme 
People’s Court’s 2006 Interpretation Transform Labor Dispute Resolution, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
753, 754 (2007). 
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among workers bringing arbitration requests are generally high,66 yet a 
vast majority of arbitration decisions are still appealed to court.67 This 
suggests that a substantial proportion of appeals have to do with 
enforcement of arbitration decisions rather than dissatisfaction with the 
outcome. Second, labor arbitration is a highly bureaucratized process. An 
arbitration panel is usually composed of government labor officials.68 
Employer representatives on the panel are nominated by government 
authorities,69 while employee representatives are drawn from the quasi-
governmental trade union.70 As such, labor arbitration “crosses over into 
bureaucratic implementation of the law, rather than constituting an 
autonomous dispute resolution procedure.”71 Third, arbitrators are likely to 
be biased against workers.72 In addition to corruption or bribery by 
employers, arbitrators are mired in conflicts of interests because the 
system forces them to obtain financial resources from local government,73 
which often seeks to promote businesses’ and employers’ interests.74 This 
inevitably skews arbitrators’ decisions. Additionally, arbitration panels are 
generally “overburdened”75 and “understaffed” in the face of an increasing 
number of arbitration requests from workers.76  
Since many arbitration outcomes require an appeal to the court for 
enforcement,77 additional expenses inevitably accrue to the appealing 
 
 
 66. In Shandong, Guangdong, and Heilongjiang Provinces where migrant labor is concentrated, 
workers won respectively 62.46%, 55.88%, and 55.32% of labor disputes brought to court from 1995 
to 2001. See Fu Hualing & D.W. Choy, From Mediation to Adjudication: Settling Labor Disputes in 
China, 3 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM 17, 21 (2004), http://www.hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.3.2004/ 
From_Mediation_to_Adjucation_-_Settling_Labor_Disputes_in_China.pdf?.  
 67. In 2003, nearly 70% of arbitration decisions were appealed in Beijing and Shanghai, the two 
economically largest cities, compared to only 1.7% in 1995. See Mary E. Gallagher, “Use the Law As 
Your Weapon!”: Institutional Change and Legal Mobilization in China, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN 
CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE 54, 73–74 (Neil J. Diamont et al. eds., 
2005). Both the 1993 Regulations on Settlement of Labor Disputes in Enterprises and the 2007 Law on 
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration allow appeal to a judicial court for arbitration error or failure 
to enforce the arbitration outcome. See Disputes Resolution Regulation, supra note 64. Mediation and 
Arbitration Law, supra note 64, arts. 48, 50–51.  
 68. Cooney, supra note 17, at 1068–69. 
 69. Id. at 1069. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 1069–70.  
 75. Gallagher, supra note 67, at 74. 
 76. Statistics from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (“MOLSS”) show that the number 
of new arbitration requests increased from 47,951 in 1996 to 226,391 in 2003. Id. at 1067–68 (citing 
Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian [Yearbook of Labor Statistics] 2004, tbl.9-1). 
 77. For information on the high appeal rate, see VIRGINIA HO, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOR RIGHTS AND LEGAL REFORM 79 (2003).  
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party—in most cases, the workers. Court filing fees and travel expenses 
incurred in seeking legal representation could cost a migrant worker his 
life savings.78 Since lawyers worry about workers’ ability to pay for legal 
services, legal representation is hard to obtain.79 Also, given the typical 
amount of time spent on a labor case, the disputed amount in each 
individual case is usually too small to be profitable.80 Although some 
lawyers work on a contingency fee basis,81 they sometimes are unwilling 
to represent migrant workers because of cultural bias.82 Some lawyers 
even fear that migrant workers will not share the damage award with them 
as previously agreed.83  
Indeed, the law creates on paper a cause of action so that workers can 
sue and obtain redress. However, protracted proceedings and limited 
resources prevent most workers from obtaining relief via legal channels. 
The legal default is also unfriendly to low-income workers because their 
claims would be limited to breach of contract under the new law and 
would not generate large enough damages to attract the plaintiffs’ bar.  
C. Oversight by Administrative Authorities 
Labor administration authorities affiliated with state and local 
governments have the legal obligation to supervise and inspect employers’ 
compliance with labor laws and regulations.84 The administrative 
 
 
 78. Woo, Day & Hugenberger, supra note 57, at 192. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Note, Class 
Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1534 (1998) (examining the impact of court 
fees). The typical salary of a migrant is averaged at ¥1,100 ($137.50) per month. See Migrant Workers 
Expect Higher Monthly Salaries, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 7, 2006, http://china.org.cn/english/ 
null/157162.htm.  
 79. See Woo, Day & Hugenberger, supra note 57, at 179 (noting that migrants cannot pay for 
legal services provided by registered lawyers). 
 80. Id. at 187–89 (observing that most private lawyers assist migrants to satisfy pro bono services 
requirements or on a contingency fee basis).  
 81. Lawyers in China are prohibited from charging contingency fees for certain labor lawsuits, 
including any action seeking payment of labor remuneration. See Lvshi fuwu shoufei guanli banfa 
[Measures for the Administration of Lawyers’ Fees] (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, State 
Development and Reform Commission, Apr. 13, 2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006) LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2008), art. 11 (P.R.C.).  
 82. See Ethan Michelson, The Practice of Law As an Obstacle to Justice: Chinese Lawyers at 
Work, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 18–21 (2006) (stating that private registered attorneys in Beijing are 
unwilling to take migrant labor cases because of the low fees available and cultural stereotypes against 
rural migrants); see also Margaret Y.K. Woo & Yaxin Wang, Civil Justice in China: An Empirical 
Study of Courts in Three Provinces, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 911, 920–23 (2005) (noting the disparate 
levels of attorney representation in rural versus urban areas).  
 83. See, e.g., Woo, Day & Hugenberger, supra note 57, at 188 n.113 (stating that a well-known 
migrant labor lawyer in Beijing allegedly was owed ¥5,000,000 from 161 former migrant clients who 
had refused to pay his fees even though the lawyer had won settlements for them). 
 84. Laodong baozhang jiancha tiaoli [Regulation on Labor Security Supervision] (promulgated 
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enforcement takes the form of “command and control” regulations.85 
Under these regulations, labor administrations may impose different levels 
of sanction on employers that violate the law, ranging from issuing 
warnings and orders for correction to imposing fines.86 Again, the power 
of local administrations to oversee the enforcement of labor laws only 
looks good on paper; it has not happened in reality.  
First, government officials lack economic and political incentives to 
scrutinize local businesses’ employment practices. Performance 
evaluations of local officials largely depend on economic growth in the 
locality.87 Forcing compliance with labor laws would add costs to local 
businesses and in turn slow down the area’s economic growth. These 
considerations easily outweigh the interest of protecting workers’ rights. 
Also, uncovering substandard labor practices may cause bad publicity88 
that negatively affects the evaluations of local officials. Consequently, 
local labor officials are generally unwilling to upset employers by 
vigorously enforcing the law. Some simply perform sporadic whirlwind-
style campaigns under the pretense of law enforcement.89 
Second, the sanctions that labor authorities may impose are not 
sufficient to overcome employers’ incentives for noncompliance. 
Incentives for engaging in illegal employment practices and adopting low 
 
 
by the St. Council, Nov. 1, 2004, effective Dec. 1, 2004) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 31, 2008), 
art. 3 (P.R.C.) (“The labor security administration of the State Council shall be in charge of the labor 
security supervision work of the whole country. The labor security administration of a local people’s 
government at the county level or at any level above shall be in charge of the labor security 
supervision work within its own administrative area.”). These labor administrations operate both under 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and under their respective local government. See Cooney, 
supra note 17, at 1061. 
 85. Cooney, supra note 17, at 1061. The “command and control”-style regulations are legal 
instruments that state rules, charge an agency with implementation, and then set out a range of 
sanctions that a state agency can impose if the rules are violated. Id. 
 86. For violation of labor laws and regulations or forcing workers to work overtime, labor 
administrations may give warnings, order corrections, and impose a fine of no less than ¥100 and no 
more than ¥500 for each affected employee. Regulation on Labor Security Supervision, supra note 84, 
art. 25. For refusal to pay wages, overtime pay, minimum pay, or economic compensation after 
cancellation of an employment contract, labor administrations may order payment and impose punitive 
damages of 50% to 100% of the total owed amount. Id. art. 26. For violations of work safety 
conditions, labor administrations may impose fines of no less than ¥1,000 and no more than ¥5,000 for 
each affected employee. Id. art. 23.  
 87. Halegua, supra note 4.  
 88. See, e.g., supra notes 6–7 (media reports about slave labor at small brick kilns). 
 89. For examples of sporadic law enforcement campaigns, see Xin Frank He, Sporadic Law 
Enforcement Campaigns As a Means of Social Control: A Case Study from a Rural-Urban Migrant 
Enclave in Beijing, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 121 (2003) (arguing that enforcement by sporadic 
campaigns is a sophisticated regime that results in legal collusion between local government, the 
enforcer, and law violators whose survival benefits the government; it achieves a balance of interests 
between central and local governments).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
608 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:595 
 
 
 
 
labor standards are extremely strong among Chinese businesses as 
everyone tries to cut costs.90 However, the labor administrations’ 
sanctioning power is limited to imposing fines. That power is further 
weakened by the fact that judicial enforcement has to be constantly 
invoked to force employers to pay workers under administrative orders.91  
Third, there is a shortage of labor inspectors across the country.92 
Consequently, businesses have sufficient time to “prepare” for 
administrative inspections by, for example, fabricating records or coaching 
employees to deceive inspectors, in case bribery does not work.  
The 2007 Labor Contract Law is silent on increasing the power of labor 
administrative authorities to compel employers’ compliance with the law. 
This seems to suggest that “command and control”-style administrative 
regulations and the above-listed defects with the current administrative 
enforcement mechanism are likely to continue.  
D. Legal Power of Trade Unions 
In developed countries, the power imbalance between workers and the 
management is usually corrected by the worker’s ability to unionize and 
pursue collective actions.93 Unions negotiate collective bargaining 
agreements and organize strikes or walk-outs to force concessions from 
the management. There is no such mechanism for counterbalancing the 
power disparity in China. The Chinese concept of trade unions is very 
different from that in Western developed countries.  
No independent trade unions are allowed in China. The only officially-
recognized and “legal” labor organizations are those affiliated with the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”).94 Different from the 
 
 
 90. Cooney, supra note 17, at 1063 (stating that noncompliance with law by some businesses 
creates substantial pressure on others that might otherwise choose to abide by the law).  
 91. See id. at 1063–64. Sean Cooney suggests that the limited sanction power available to labor 
administrations is an “unfortunate by-product” of administrative reforms aimed at preventing agencies 
from arbitrarily imposing punishments on individuals. Id. at 1064.  
 92. Id. at 1066 (citing Zhongguo falv nianjian [Law Yearbook of China] 45 (2003) and other 
sources) (stating that there are three thousand inspecting agencies and forty thousand labor inspectors 
in China, yet the number of business entities in China total thirty million). 
 93. Id. at 1072. 
 94. Gonghui fa [Trade Union Law] (adopted by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, amended 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001), art. 11, 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 31, 2008) (P.R.C.). The ACFTU is considered the largest labor 
organization in the world, with a membership of almost 170 million, more than 500,000 full-time 
officials, and more than 1.3 million “grassroots level” (enterprise-level) unions. All-China Fed’n of 
Trade Unions, A Brief Introduction to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (Sept. 20, 2007), 
http://www.acftu.org.cn/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=63&aid=156. It has been suggested that in 
addition to political reasons, market conditions are not conducive to the cultivation of independent 
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western concept of trade unions, the ACFTU is a “quasi-governmental 
entity.”95 As a matter of law, it is subordinate to both the state and the 
Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).96 It partially relies on government 
subsidies for funding.97 It has limited legal authority to protect labor 
interests and seek concessions from the management.98  
More importantly, the law prohibits unions from organizing strikes.99 
Instead, the primary role of unions in China is to “prevent work 
stoppages.”100 Without the right to organize strikes, unions in China lack 
the basic weapon to defend workers’ rights from arbitrary and abusive 
management practices. 
An important legal power that unions in China do have is the ability to 
negotiate collective contracts.101 However, research has shown that 
 
 
labor unions in China because unless there is labor scarcity, which would allow workers to take 
advantage of their enhanced bargaining power against the management, it is difficult for independent 
labor unions to become established. Josephs, supra note 8, at 578–79.  
 95. Ronald C. Brown, China’s Collective Contract Provisions: Can Collective Negotiations 
Embody Collective Bargaining?, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 52 (2006). 
 96. See Trade Union Law, supra note 94, art. 4 (stating that trade unions must “insist on the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.”); ACFTU Charter General Principles (2003), available 
at http://www.acftu.org/template/10005/file.jsp?cid=807&aid=42622 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) 
(noting that trade unions are “important social pillars for the state political regime”).  
 97. Trade Union Law, supra note 94, art. 42 (naming the other sources of funding: membership 
dues, two percent of all employees’ pre-tax wages, a portion of revenues submitted by state-owned 
enterprises to local governments, and other miscellaneous revenues of the union). 
 98. The union may request that the management correct violations of labor standards, assist 
employees in signing individual contracts, negotiate and sign collective contracts on behalf of member 
employees, and seek arbitration or lawsuits if necessary to remedy the management’s violation of 
terms in the collective contract. See Trade Union Law, supra note 94, arts. 19–20, 49. Before the 
management may unilaterally terminate an individual labor contract, it must first notify the union and 
if any objection is raised by the union, the management must study the union’s opinion but not 
necessarily accept the opinion or change the termination decision. Id. art. 21. Additionally, unions 
have obligations to support and assist an individual worker’s pursuit of legal rights at arbitration or 
litigation. Id.; see Labor Contract Law, supra note 2, art. 78.  
 99. Trade Union Law, supra note 94, art. 25 (stating that when a strike or disruption to 
production occurs, the trade union at the enterprise shall negotiate with the enterprise management and 
assist the latter in reviving production and workplace order as quickly as possible). The right to strike 
was removed from the 1982 Constitution and strikes have been considered illegal since. See XIAN FA 
art. 15 (1982) (P.R.C.) (“The state prohibits in accordance with the law any organization or individual 
from disturbing the social-economic order.”). However, worker-initiated strikes still happen quite 
often and sometimes on a large scale. There were eight thousand reported strikes in China in 2000 and 
subsequently dozens of strikes involving as many as fifty thousand workers. St. Antoine, supra note 
18, at 109. 
 100. Lawrence Cox, Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social 
Disenfranchisement for China’s Internal Migrant Workers, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 370, 412 
(2007).  
 101. The 2004 Jiti hetong guiding [Provisions on Collective Contracts] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Jan. 20, 2004, effective May 1, 2004) LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2008) (P.R.C.) provides details for the process of negotiating and signing collective 
contracts, which include the selection of negotiating representatives, scope of negotiable subjects, 
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collective contracts do not provide increased protection to workers 
because they are rarely enforced or renewed.102 What’s more, the 
bargaining process has the potential of being bureaucratized. The 
negotiation, formation, and performance of collective contracts are subject 
to the supervision of local government authorities.103 When a dispute 
arises in the bargaining process, either party may submit a written 
application to the local labor administrative authority and get it involved in 
resolving the dispute.104 With the local government interjecting itself into 
the negotiation process, the final collective contract becomes in effect “an 
agreement between the local party-state and the firm’s management.”105  
Further undermining the union’s role in representing individual 
workers and seeking meaningful law enforcement is the fact that the 
union’s interest in China has been aligned with that of the management.106 
Since the union is subordinate to the Party and the Party’s primary goal 
now is to promote economic growth,107 the union’s interest is inevitably 
aligned with the interest of business owners and the management; the 
union ends up sharing the same goal as the management, which is to 
 
 
supervision by the local labor administration, procedures for collective negotiation, and duties of 
proper conduct for collective negotiations such as fair representation and fair treatment of employees. 
Brown, supra note 95, at 38–45.  
 102. Gallagher, supra note 9, at 23. Of the thirteen thousand labor disputes arbitrated in Shanghai 
in 2001, not a single dispute concerned a collective contract; one trade union official stated “we won’t 
re-sign collective contracts again in three years unless we are forced to, because this thing has no 
meaning.” Id. 
 103. Provisions on Collective Contracts, supra note 101, art. 7. See also Labor Contract Law, 
supra note 2, art. 54 (stating that collective contracts are only effective if local labor administration 
authorities receive a copy and raise no objections within fifteen days of receipt).  
 104. Id. art. 49. The administrative resolution must be completed in thirty days with an extension 
of no more than fifteen days. Id. art. 52. At the end of the administrative resolution process, an 
agreement on dispute resolution must be formulated and signed by both the parties and the labor 
administration authority. Id. art. 53. 
 105. Gallagher, supra note 9, at 23. 
 106. See Zana Z. Bugaighis, What Impact Will the Revised Trade Union Law of China Have on 
Foreign Business?, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 405, 409 (2007); John Bruce Lewis & Bruce L. Ottley, 
China’s Developing Labor Law, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1175 (1982) (stating that unions have been 
used as a vehicle to transmit Party policy downward and that their power has been limited by the 
Party’s transfer of control over unions to local Party committees). Many administrative functions 
formerly performed by unions were transferred to the Party during the Great Leap Forward period 
(1958–1960). Id. The ACFTU was first established in 1925 and operated under the principle of 
democratic centralism. See Bugaighis, supra, at 408–09. Before the privatization of the economy, 
workers’ interests were protected by lifetime jobs and benefits, therefore the union had no need to play 
a strong role in asserting labor rights. See Gallagher, supra note 9, at 23. For a description of the 
historical development of the ACFTU, see Bugaighis, supra, 408–11; All-China Fed’n of Trade 
Unions, A Brief History of the ACFTU’s Development (Sept. 30, 2007), http://english.acftu.org/ 
template/10002/file.jsp?cid=65&aid=214.  
 107. Gallagher, supra note 9, at 23. 
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maintain workplace harmony.108 In reality, the union often plays the role 
of mediating disputes between the management and workers.109  
The low unionization rate at FIEs and domestic private enterprises 
where labor abuses most often occur further dampens the hope of relying 
on union power to make sure what is written on paper is carried out in 
everyday employment practices.110  
Compared to government labor authorities, trade unions ought to be a 
stronger force in securing employer compliance with the law. Union 
officials outnumber government inspectors,111 and grassroots-level union 
officials are located within the business, which facilitates monitoring. 
However, the union’s actual compliance function is weak. Due to its Party 
and state affiliations, it has little legal power to compel employers’ 
 
 
 108. The President of the ACFTU, Wang Zhaoguo, remarked on the heels of the promulgation of 
the Labor Contract Law that efforts to protect the legal rights of workers were required to “bring the 
role of the working class as the main force in promoting social harmony into full play.” Union Leader 
Calls for Protecting Workers’ Legal Rights, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 18, 2008, http://news. 
xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/18/content_7449418.htm. 
 109. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 9, at 29–30 (stating that the trade union is “part of the total 
developmentalist machine” at China’s economic development zones as it serves as a mediator between 
foreign management and Chinese workers for purposes of creating harmony and consensus and that, in 
the event of a strike, the union acts in cooperation with the Public Security Bureau and the Labor 
Bureau to resume production as quickly as possible).  
 As a matter of fact, enterprise management often dominates unions. The management usually 
participates in the selection of union representatives and most union officials in FIEs and SOEs jointly 
serve in management positions. Id. at 28, 32. See Trade Union Law, supra note 94, art. 9 (prohibiting 
close relatives of enterprise managers from becoming candidates for union positions but imposing no 
such prohibition on management personnel themselves). Additionally, union officials are paid wages 
and benefits by enterprise management. Id. art. 41.  
 110. See Brown, supra note 95, at 57. There are indications that the unionization rate at FIEs may 
go up fairly quickly in the near future. See Gallagher, supra note 9, at 29, 31 (suggesting that FIEs, 
especially Japanese firms, support the unionization of employees because of cultural barriers in 
directly communicating to employees and for purposes of establishing a good public image; however, 
Taiwanese companies tend to suppress unionization because of mistrust of the Communist Party); 
Bugaighis, supra note 106, at 405 (stating that Wal-Mart, the biggest anti-union company in the 
United States, agreed to allow unionization among its employees in China after resisting infiltration of 
the ACFTU for two years). The goal is to unionize eighty percent of FIEs by the end of 2007. Id. at 
406. In August 2006, twenty-six percent of FIEs were unionized. Id. at 427. There was even a proposal 
by the ACFTU President, Wang Zhaoguo, to make foreign enterprise unionization mandatory. Id. at 
427–28. On the other hand, it is unknown whether the unionization rate at domestic private enterprises 
will go up as quickly. By 2003, at most thirty percent of domestic private enterprises were unionized. 
Cooney, supra note 17, at 1076. The ACFTU has adopted the approach of establishing national or 
regional industrial unions instead of enterprise-level unions to incorporate domestic small and medium 
private enterprises. See Brown at 58; Labor Contract Law, supra note 2, art. 53 (noting that industry-
wide collective contracts or regional collective contracts may be established among small businesses in 
the construction, mining, and restaurant industries).  
 111. There were three thousand labor inspecting agencies and forty thousand official labor 
inspectors in China in 2002. Cooney, supra note 17, at 1066 (citing Law Year Book of China (2003)). 
According to ACFTU, there are five hundred thousand full-time union officials. See Cooney, supra 
note 92 and accompanying text.  
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compliance with the law. It has no right to organize strikes, nor the power 
to negotiate collective contracts in an adversarial way. Despite the large 
number of union members in China, the unionization rate is still low in 
FIEs and private enterprises where labor relations are the most 
contentious.112 Even if workers in those enterprises are unionized, they 
have no way of gaining more leverage as they cannot effectively mobilize 
the union to act against the management.113  
The 2007 Labor Contract Law undoubtedly makes a significant stride 
from the 1994 Labor Law. It reads an implied contract into every 
employment relationship and makes the termination of an employment 
contract much harder than before. The significant changes in law could 
substantially enhance the protection of labor rights, if only they were to be 
carried into full force in practice. An examination of the current 
enforcement regime—including voluntary compliance by employers, 
enforcement efforts by individual workers, oversight and inspection by 
government administrative authorities, and collective negotiation by trade 
unions—does not present an optimistic picture. In this sense, the 2007 
Labor Contract Law is no more than a beginning.  
III. CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT—AN ALTERNATIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OPTION 
The insufficiency of the existing labor law enforcement mechanism 
requires a search for alternatives. An alternative mechanism needs to 
create enough deterrence to stop employers from violating the law and 
new incentives for government enforcement authorities to take vigorous 
actions. It must also take into consideration the reality that workers 
generally lack financial resources to pursue legal actions individually.  
Workers in China have filed and won class action lawsuits against 
employers, even though the number of such cases remains low.114 There 
 
 
 112. Until 2003, unions did not represent migrant workers because they were classified as 
agricultural workers and therefore not part of the “working class” participating in the union. Cooney, 
supra note 17, at 1076. 
 113. See Brown, supra note 95, at 71 (stating that there is no consequence for the union even if it 
does not fully or fairly represent employees’ interests in labor rights disputes, and proposing that 
affirmative obligations should be imposed on the union and legal causes of action should be created by 
which the union’s action or inaction could be challenged by employees). 
 114. Liebman, supra note 78, at 1529 n.49 (mentioning twenty workers who successfully sued 
their former employer for back pay); Traci Daffer, Note, “I Am Fighting for the Right to Eat, and I 
Will Keep Fighting. The Truth Is on Our Side”: Class Action Litigation As a Means of Enacting Social 
Change in China, 75 UMKC L. REV. 227, 231–32 (2006) (noting that six hundred former textile 
workers filed a pending class action lawsuit seeking back wages). Around ten percent of suits filed 
annually are class actions. Id. at 231. 
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are both benefits and difficulties for joining all potential claimants in a 
lawsuit, but compared to other means of changing the status quo, class 
action lawsuits remain a viable option under the current legal framework 
and political climate in China. 
A. Legal and Political Feasibility  
China is one of the few countries outside the United States that allow 
citizens to file class action lawsuits.115 The Law of Civil Procedure 
contains two provisions on “joint lawsuits.” Articles 54 and 55 of the law 
allow class action suits for cases involving a fixed and unknown number 
of litigants, respectively.116  
Filing a class action lawsuit is a politically feasible option to resolve 
labor disputes, in contrast to holding strikes and labor protests, which are 
illegal in China and unlikely to gain legal status in the near future. “[T]he 
Party has given ‘direct or indirect’ backing to ‘nearly all class action 
suits.’”117 The reason is not hard to understand: “the government would 
prefer seeing ‘disputes settled in the courts rather than streets,’”118 as the 
former still gives the government a measure of control.  
 
 
 115. Daffer, supra note 114, at 227. Even though civil law countries often reject joint lawsuits 
because they appear to ignore the distinction between the public and private spheres and bind unnamed 
parties to the outcome, China is unique in that it has a strong collective tradition. Id. at 229 (pointing to 
Confucian principles, which deny individual rights, and Maoist communism, which stresses total 
immersion in the collectivity).  
 116. Mingshi susong fa [Civil Procedure Law] (adopted by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 
1991, revised by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Oct. 28, 2007) 
arts. 54, 55. However, under article 55, a potential claimant must opt in by registering with the court in 
order to be a party to the lawsuit, which is different from the U.S. opt-out approach adopted in FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23. A potential problem with the opt-in approach is that a Chinese court has the discretion to 
issue (or not) notice of the lawsuit. Daffer, supra note 114, at 231. This means that without notice 
potential claimants, especially those in rural areas, are unlikely to join a lawsuit. 
 117. Daffer, supra note 114, at 237 (citing Shai Oster, Order in the Court, ASIAWEEK (Nov. 9, 
2001)). Preliminary research seems to indicate a pattern that class action lawsuits against private 
businesses tend to prevail while those against local governments are likely to fail. Id. at 232–35 (listing 
examples of successful and unsuccessful class action lawsuits). However, under the Administrative 
Procedure Law, no suit can be brought against the Communist Party; only specific administrative 
actions can be challenged. Id. at 235. 
 118. Id. at 237–38. The Chinese government has taken great efforts to channel more social 
dissatisfaction into the legal mechanism. The Ministry of Justice has advocated establishing a 
population of law, or pufa, as a means to improve citizens’ familiarity with legal rights and 
institutions. Ministry of Justice, Law Popularization, http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/english/Law-
Popularization/node_7616.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). 
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B. Benefits of Filing a Labor Class Action  
Class action lawsuits, first and foremost, solve the cost problem of 
individual lawsuits. When a group of workers seek justice collectively, 
limited financial resources may be pooled together to overcome the 
constraint imposed by court costs and attorneys’ fees that would have been 
prohibitive had the workers litigated individually.119  
On a related point, the possibility of filing a class action lawsuit creates 
incentives for lawyers to represent low-income workers. Lawyers may see 
the opportunity to obtain not only financial but also reputational benefits, 
even though each separate individual claim may only generate limited 
fees.120 It is very likely that the publicity received by high profile cases 
will create future business for the lawyer.  
Media attention attracted by class action lawsuits also helps empower 
workers seeking legal remedies.121 If the damages awarded in a class 
action are too low to hurt an employer’s bottom line, the social and 
political pressure generated by intense media coverage of the lawsuit 
would probably be enough to make not only the employer but also local 
government authorities feel compelled to respond. Sometimes simply 
filing the lawsuit would be enough to force the employer to settle or attract 
the interest of higher-level government officials.122 Especially for FIEs, 
media exposure would be an effective deferent, as foreign investors 
generally worry about both domestic and overseas publicity. For potential 
claimants, constant media reports of labor lawsuits provide examples of 
others seeking legal actions and show that such actions are feasible.  
 
 
 119. The Civil Procedure Law, supra note 116, art. 107, permits courts to reduce or waive costs 
when appropriate. The Supreme People’s Court has stated that in class actions court fees shall be paid 
by the losing party. Liebman, supra note 78, at 1534. 
 120. Until the promulgation of the 1996 Lawyers Law, all lawyers remained “state legal workers,” 
but now they are free to choose their cases. Id. at 1536. However, government regulation prohibits 
lawyers from charging on a contingency basis for “collective litigation” or suits seeking back wages. 
Measures for the Administration of Lawyers’ Fees, supra note 81, arts. 11–12. In addition, it is unclear 
to what extent lawyers can legally encourage class action or expand the plaintiff group. Liebman, 
supra note 78, at 1538. 
 121. See Keith J. Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and 
Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
114, 183–84 (arguing that media coverage and internet dissemination could play a critical role in 
China’s legal reforms by catching the attention of senior officials and forcing the government to be 
responsive).  
 122. Liebman, supra note 78, at 1540–41 (noting the pressure is particularly important given the 
difficulties courts face in enforcing judgments and the power local authorities often have over local 
courts).  
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C. Difficulties Facing Labor Class Actions  
A labor class action lawsuit, like any other labor or employment 
lawsuit in China, faces the institutional barrier that arbitration must 
precede litigation. Thus, it is especially troublesome for potential class 
action plaintiffs because they would have to synchronize their proceedings 
so that everyone is finished with arbitration and eligible to file a lawsuit at 
the same time. The mandatory arbitration requirement also creates 
problems for those who wish to opt in as class members but have not yet 
undergone arbitration. Some scholars have already suggested that the 
mandatory arbitration requirement must be abolished for more effective 
enforcement of labor law in China.123  
Additionally, some lawyers may be deterred from representing workers 
in a class action lawsuit despite the prospect of reaping a hefty fee, as a 
large-scale, high-stake litigation often puts the lawyer in the spotlight and 
subjects him or her to retaliation by the employer.124  
Local protectionism may work against class-action lawsuits as well. 
Courts in China are funded by local governments and local Party 
personnel offices have the power to nominate judges.125 Thus, “the 
favoring of locals over outsiders” may exert extrajudicial influence on the 
outcome.126 Even without the external pressure, judges may be unwilling 
to accept class action suits due to the concern that the cases will be too 
complex and time-consuming for them to manage.127 Some judges may 
simply feel they are not competent enough to adjudicate class actions.128 
In any case, individuals may not be timely informed of the opportunity 
to opt in as a member of the class.129 They may also be intimidated from 
 
 
 123. See Cooney, supra note 17, at 1088. 
 124. See Lee, supra note 52 (mentioning that lawyers trying to reach out to migrant workers and 
educate them about protections under the new labor law are subject to severe physical violence such as 
beating, hacking, and disfigurement); Daffer, supra note 114, at 234 (noting that a lawyer representing 
investors in a class action claim against the government for illegal seizure of their oil wells was 
imprisoned for four months). 
 125. Daffer, supra note 114, at 238–39. 
 126. Id. at 238. 
 127. Judges are often evaluated based on the number of cases they process. A class action creates 
extra work for a judge: he must notify prospective class members, supervise the appointment of class 
representatives, and if plaintiffs are successful, oversee the distribution of awards to large numbers of 
individuals. Liebman, supra note 78, at 1533. 
 128. Until 1995, neither a college degree nor formal legal training were required for a person to 
become a judge in China. Daffer, supra note 114, at 241–42. 
 129. Liebman, supra note 78, at 1535 n.89 (observing that although notices of class actions may 
be publicized in popular newspapers or on television, they may also be publicized only in legal 
newspapers or court circulars). 
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joining a class action when the employer is well-connected and the chance 
of retaliation is high.130  
CONCLUSION 
A meaningful evaluation of China’s new Labor Contract Law is 
incomplete without contemplating how effectively the law will be 
enforced in actuality. Ever since the opening of China three decades ago, 
foreign investors have entered the country not only to take advantage of 
the huge market, but also to benefit from the low labor cost.131 Gradually 
the Chinese labor market has reset, and arguably lowered, the global norm 
for wages and work standards. Labor organizations and academics have 
described the global impact of this phenomenon as a “race to the 
bottom.”132 This situation has affected China’s international relations—the 
United States has insisted that China implement a labor standard 
consistent with international standards and has used China’s labor 
practices as a condition for granting trade privileges.133  
It has been more than twenty years since the Chinese government first 
chose to transform the country’s labor system from one that was 
completely subject to central planning to one that is based on a free-market 
contract system. The change may have been abrupt initially, but that does 
not justify the fact that what was drafted twenty years ago has yet to be 
fully implemented in practice. This Note argues that due to the lack of an 
effective enforcement mechanism, the law has been relegated to paper, 
while in reality politics and the market dictate employment relations. 
Consequently, reports of labor scandals and workers’ protests abound as 
China leads the world in the “race to the bottom.”  
In passing the 2007 Labor Contract Law, the Chinese government has 
signaled to the world its determination to improve the country’s labor 
record. As if to compensate for the impotent enforcement regime, the new 
law includes many pro-labor provisions that risk sending the country back 
to the low-productivity “iron rice bowl” era. What is missing in the new 
legal framework, however, are specific measures addressing the chronic 
failure of law enforcement.  
 
 
 130. Id. at 1533–34. 
 131. China alone accounted for fifty percent of the double increase in global workforce in the past 
several decades. Tim Costello et al., Labor Rights in China, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, Dec. 21, 
2006, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3824. About twenty-five percent of the global workforce is now 
Chinese. UNDUE INFLUENCE, supra note 4, at 10.  
 132. See Costello et al., supra note 131.  
 133. Josephs, supra note 8, at 577. 
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This Note examined the current labor law enforcement regime by 
taking the stances of employers, individual workers, government agencies, 
and trade unions. It analyzed, from each party’s perspective, why law 
enforcement does not follow through on a seemingly solid legal 
foundation. The analysis suggests the need for an alternative enforcement 
mechanism—class action lawsuit—which would allow individual workers 
to have more control in a collective way. A class action lawsuit has the 
strength of being a feasible option under the current political climate in 
China. In contrast to public protests, it allows individual workers to remain 
within the bounds of the legal process; it fits into the government’s agenda 
to establish and present to the world a modern legal society, and it 
dovetails the political scheme to funnel social discontent through courts 
rather than letting disputes play out on the street. “Imagining what is 
possible, tempered by what is likely within ‘Chinese conditions,’ can move 
forward the possibilities of real labor reform.”134 Admittedly, some 
collective labor actions that only intend to generate modest public pressure 
may be construed as an intolerable threat to the Party and the state. 
Hopefully, by keeping disputes inside a courtroom, class action lawsuits 
will more likely be construed as the former rather than the latter. 
Yin Lily Zheng∗ 
 
 
 134. Brown, supra note 94, at 69. 
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